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I. INTRODUCTION
Barbara Luck worked for Southern Pacific Transportation
Company in their San Francisco office as a computer program-
mer. I Over her more than six years of employment, her employer
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Temple University School of Busi-
ness & Management. B.A., Colby College (1970); M.A., Jordanhill College
(Glasgow, Scotland 1974); J.D., Rutgers University (Camden 1981).
Other articles by Professor Halbert include The First Amendment in the l'ork-
place: An Analysis & Call For Reform, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 42 (1987) and The
Cost of Scruples: A Call For Common Law Protection for the Professional Whistleblower,
10 NOVA L.J. 1 (1985).
1. See Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., C 84-3-230 (Calif. Super. Ct., S.F.
Cty. 1986) The facts of the case were taken from memoranda filed in the Luck
(691)
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had repeatedly complimented her on excellent work. She worked
at a desk; none of her duties involved the actual operation of
trains.
On the morning ofJuly 11, 1985, without notice of any kind,
Ms. Luck was told by her superiors to sign a medical consent
form, to go into a company bathroom, to urinate into a bottle and
to give the bottle to a company nurse. She was told that her urine
sample would be tested for the presence of drugs, alcohol or
medication.
Apart from the fact that she was three and one-half months
pregnant at the time, and had told very few people at work, Ms.
Luck claimed she had nothing to hide. Yet she was unwilling to
sign the consent form because she believed Southern Pacific's de-
mands were unjustifiable and in violation of her personal rights.
When she refused to be tested, she was fired.
Urinalysis drug testing of employees has lately become very
popular, and appears to be on the increase. 2 As of this writing,
statistics indicate that an estimated four to five million people un-
dergo such screening each year.3 The U.S. military, which began
its program in 1981 conducts about half of the total tests adminis-
tered in this country;4 many public employees are subjected to
them;5 and President Reagan's Commission on Organized Crime
litigation. See Memorandum in opposition to Defendent's Demurrer, Luck v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., C 84-3-230 (Calif. Super. Ct., S.F. Cty. 1986). On
October 30, 1987, the jury ordered Southern Pacific to pay Ms. Luck $484,000.
2. Stille, Drug Testing: The Scene is Set for a Dramatic Legal Collision Between the
Rights of Employees and Workers, 8 NAT'L L.J. 29, April 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1. For
example, drug screening is being conducted by one fourth of the leading U.S.
industrial companies. Id. Twenty-five percent of all Fortune 500 companies em-
ploy some form of drug testing program. Id. at 23, col. 3.
Nearly one third of the "Fortune 500" companies used some form of drug
testing in 1985. Marty, Miller, Cohn, Raine & Canoll, Trying to Say No, NEWs-
WEEK, Aug. 11, 1986, at 17 (hereinafter "Marty"). The U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce estimated that more than half of the Fortune 500 companies will have
drug screening programs in place by the end of 1987. Drug TestsAre Often Unreli-
able, Health Official Tells House Panel, The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 11, 1987, at
2, col. 1.
3. Stille, supra note 2, at 24, col. 1.
4. Id. at 1, col. 1.
5. Id. at 22, col. 1. For example, in May of 1986 the Boston police commis-
sioner called for mandatory testing of all officers. And since January 1985, job
applicants at the U.S. postal service in Philadelphia have been screened by
urinalysis. According to Jim Burke, president of the American Postal Workers'
Union in Philadelphia, 500 prospective employees have already been rejected on
the basis of their test results. See Alcohol and Drug Testing, A Workshop on
Invasion of Privacy, sponsored by Philaposh and the Workers' Rights Law Pro-
ject, Philadelphia, May 22, 1986. For a detailed discussion of the intrusiveness
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recently called for testing of all federal workers. 6 But urinalysis is
hardly confined to government employment; nearly one third of
the Fortune 500 companies use testing programs of some kind. 7
According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, sub-
stance abuse by workers cost employers some $60 billion a year
and is clearly an enormous problem.8 What is considerably less
clear is whether urinalysis makes sense as a mechanism for weed-
ing out drug-abusing workers. This article focuses on the testing
of personnel like Barbara Luck, who are non-unionized, private
employees. The article presents only a topical survey of certain
issues central to a thorough resolution of the thorny and sensitive
problem of drug testing at the workplace, including the present
forms of legal resistance available to workers under the common
law, potential avenues of constitutional redress 9 and a more fo-
cused survey of the competing, yet often overlapping interests of
employers, employees and the general public. Finally, the outline
of a legislative scheme is suggested which would best serve the
strongest of these interests.
II. POTENTIAL REDRESS FOR EMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW
How might the common law provide redress for employees
who feel that they have been legally injured by submission to
of drug testing techniques and potential constitutional issues, see infra notes 45-
97 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the recommendations of the President's Commission
on the use of drug testing in the workplace, see Panel Members Say They Veren't
Given Final Report, N.Y. Times, March 6, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Crime Panel Head Quali-
fies Support For Drug Testing, Wall St. J., March 5, 1986, at 12, col. 2; U.S. Panel
Urges Testing Workers For Use of Drugs, N.Y. Times, March 4, 1986, at 1, col. 1;
Kaufman, The Battle Over Drug Testing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1986 (Magazine), at
92 (authored by Irving R. Kaufman, a judge on the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit who also served as chairman of the President's
Commission on Organized Crime). See also Reagan Administration Drug Testing Pro-
gram Pro & Con, CONG. DIG. 131 (May 1987).
7. Stille, supra note 2, at 23, col. 1. For example, aerospace companies, air-
lines and railroads were the first members of the corporate community to insti-
tute drug testing of their employees. Id. They were joined next by AT&T, IBM,
General Motors, Ford and DuPont. Id.
8. Such figures reflect lost productivity, higher health insurance and work-
ers' compensation costs, the expense of replacing and training new employees,
property damage and theft of property. Id.
9. Although constitutional restrictions are mainly effective against govern-
mental, as opposed to private employers, the article does survey this body of law
and the possibility of constitutional attacks on drug testing by private employees
is briefly entertained. For a discussion of these issues, see infra notes 45-97 and
accompanying text. For a related discussion of potential protections for employ-
ees under state constitutions, see infra notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
1987] 693
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urinalysis? The common law evolves in response to cultural and
economic forces, but very slowly, in part because of the effects of
stare decisis and the unwillingness of most judges to second guess
legislative intent. Nevertheless, the common law does provide
aggrieved employees with several possible causes of action. The
following discussion briefly catalogues several potential tort ac-
tions available to the employee along with some observations
concerning the difficulty of succeeding under current common
law doctrine.
A. Defamation
A defamation action might lie for an employee whose reputa-
tion was stigmatized by a mistaken indication of drug use-the so-
called "false positive." For example in Houston Belt & Terminal Ry.
& Co. v. Wheny, 10 Joe Wherry sued his former boss for libel, al-
leging that he had been branded as a recovering heroin addict
because of test results which (mistakenly) recorded a trace of
methadone in his system.'1 An award of $150,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $50,000 in punitive was affirmed on appeal. 12
It should be noted, however, that an action in defamation can
only by brought after a test has been administered and after the
employee has already been wrongfully labelled by the false result.
Furthermore, an employee must show that the employee commu-
nicated the inaccurate test results to at least one other person,
besides the worker.' 3 And employers may argue in defense that
they had an interest, namely, identifying substance-abusers in
their employ.' 4 For these reasons, the success of a defamation
suit in the context of employee drug testing appears to be limited
to situations in which employee records (containing inaccuracies
or lies) are passed on to third parties such as creditors, or insur-
ance companies, or other employers.' 5
10. 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 962
(1977). The railroad issued a written report indicating the false results of
Wherry's urinalysis test after an accident in which Wherry was involved. Id. at
745. In his suit against the railroad, Wherry's recovery was grounded on evi-
dence that the railroad had knowingly published false statements which implied
that Wherry was a drug addict. Id. at 755.
11. Id. at 745.
12. See id.
13. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 113, at 797 (5th ed. 1984) ("[S]ince
the interest protected is that of reputation, it is essential to tort liability ... that
the defamation be communicated to someone other than the person defamed.").
14. Lehr & Middlebrooks, Workplace Privacy Issues and Employer Screening Poli-
cies, II EMP. REL. L.J. 407 (1985-86).
15. See Note, Privacy Rights in Medical Records, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165,
694 [Vol. 32: p. 691
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B. Invasion of Privacy
Unlike defamation, an employer's statements need not be
false in order to trigger the tort of invasion of privacy. However,
other restrictive criteria make the privacy tort a difficult action to
sustain for the employee ordered to undergo urinalysis.
Of the four torts 16 subsumed under invasion of privacy, two
might apply here: intrusion' 7 and public disclosure of private
facts.' 8 Intrusion involves moving in on another person's soli-
tude in a manner considered highly offensive. Courts have used
reasoning similar to that underlying the tort of intrusion to enjoin
unauthorized prying into a plaintiff's bank account, 19 and to
block compulsory blood testing.20 In intrusion cases courts focus
on two main factors: (1) the obnoxiousness of the means used to
intrude, i.e., whether it is an accepted means of ascertaining rele-
vant information, and (2) the defendant's reason for intruding. 2'
179 (1985). Analogous to the use of defamation in drug testing situations is its
use in cases involving disclosure of sensitive medical records. Id. In such cases,
the focus of the defamation action is on the disclosure of confidential records
and not on the records themselves. Id; see also Duffy, Privacy vs. Disclosure.- Balanc-
ing Employee and Employer Rights, 7 EMp. REL. L.J. 594, 599 (1982). Professor
Duffy notes that, although the threat of litigating a defamation action causes
concern among employers, the tort affords little actual protection for employee
privacy, since employers have a qualified privilege to divulge information, in
good faith, in response to legitimate inquiry. Duffy, supra, at 599 (citing W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 106 at 737 (4th ed. 1971)).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B-E (1977) (Intrusion upon
Seclusion, Appropriation of Name or Likeness, Publicity Placing Person in False
Light and Publicity Given to Private Life).
17. Id. at § 652B. Section 652B provides:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the soli-
tude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Id.
18. Id. at § 652D. Section 652D provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of an-
other is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
Id.
19. See Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34, 36 (1929) (intrusion into
plaintiffs' bank records enjoined on theory that records are property rights de-
serving of protection from intrusive disclosure); Zimmerman v. Wilson, 105 F.2d
583, 584 (3d Cir. 1939) (intrusion into tax records for no demonstrable cause
was enjoinable in part, as invasion of "the natural law of privacy").
20. Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (1940) (subjecting
wife and child to blood test against their will would violate right of personal
privacy).
21. See PROSSER, supra note 11, § 117, at 856.
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In the typical drug testing scenario, most urine samples are taken
under uniform, regulated conditions, and the purpose for the
testing is important. Therefore, it is unlikely that the procedure
would be characterized as intrusive in the above sense.
As for the tort of disclosure, communication of the informa-
tion must be public, not private.2 2 In other words, unless the re-
sults of urinalysis were posted on a bulletin board or announced
to a group of employees, this cause of action would be flawed.
Perhaps an even greater obstacle, the Second Restatement of
Torts, makes legitimate public interest in the information dis-
closed a viable defense to the prima facie case. 23
Both forms of invasion of privacy are vulnerable to the claim
that the employee consented to the test. Arguably, though, there
can be no genuine consent between employer and employee
given the power the former has over the latter. An analogous
point was made by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Com-
munity Distributors, Inc. 24 Community Distributors was a criminal case
against a company that gave lie-detector tests to its employees
after obtaining the employees' signed consent.25 Although state
law made submission to a polygraph test as a condition of em-
ployment a criminal offense, the company argued that it had acted
with the voluntary cooperation of its workers.2 6 Nevertheless, the
court held that such a submission was an invasion of privacy 27
finding no "assurance of true voluntariness [because of] eco-
nomic compulsion."28  An even more far reaching result was
reached by the Florida District Court of Appeals in City of Palm
22. Id.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment d; see Virgil v.
Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 998, on remand
424 F.Supp. 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (privilege to disclose extends to all matters
customarily regarded as news).
24. 64 N.J. 479, 317 A.2d 697 (1974). Plaintiff employees were asked to
sign consent forms which stated that the employees were not forced to take a lie
detector test as a condition of employment. Id. at 481, 317 A.2d at 698. Based
upon the test results, some of the employees were dismissed. Id. The state
charged the employer with violating a New Jersey statute which forbid employ-
ers from requiring lie detector tests as a condition of employment. Id. at 482,
317 A.2d at 698. Notwithstanding the signed consent forms, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that because employees would view the test as a condition
of employment, Community Distributors had violated the state statute. Id., 317
A.2d at 698.
25. Id. at 481, 317 A.2d at 698.
26. Id. at 482, 317 A.2d at 698.
27. Id. at 489, 317 A.2d at 702.
28. Id. at 484, 317 A.2d at 699.
696 [Vol. 32: p. 691
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Bay v. Bauman.2 9 In reviewing an injunction requiring the city to
refrain from random drug testing of its police officers and
firefighters, the court held that random urinalysis was unconstitu-
tional.30 Such random testing absent a reasonable suspicion of
drug abuse was held to violate the individual's fourth amendment
expectation of privacy in the "discharge and disposition of his
urine." 3' The court also noted that the signing of a "notice"
under threat of disciplinary action made the employees' "con-
sent" merely illusory.32
C. Wrongful Dismissal
A potential path of redress for the employee who is fired for
refusing to submit to urinalysis may be an action for wrongful dis-
missal. However, the circumscribed scope of this tort presents
certain limitations. In the absence of a contract expressly stating
the length of employment, the general rule is that an employee
can be fired at any time for any reason. This is the doctrine of
"employment-at-will." 33 Some 65% of American workers are
presently at its mercy, 34 but it has come under increasing attack in
the last few decades. 35
One sign of the assault on the doctrine is the gradual recog-
nition of a cause of action for wrongful discharge where the firing
29. 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. App. 1985).
30. Id. at 1325.
31. Id. at 1324.
32. Id. at 1324-25.
33. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at
272 (1877). For an overview of the development of the employment-at-will doc-
trine, see H. PERRIr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.4 (2d ed.
1987).
34. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, n.2 (1980) (noting that ap-
proximately 60% of American workers are hired on an at will basis, 22% are
unionized and 15% are federal or state employees).
35. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1410-13 (1967);
Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 279, 315-18 (1971); Summers, Individual
Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 484-91
(1976); Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee [Vho "Blows the Whis-
tle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 WIS. L. REV.
777, 780-85 (1977); Note, Protecting Employees At [Vill Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1942-47 (1983); Note, A Com-
mon Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1446-
54 (1975); Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to
Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal In Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L.
REV. 805, 822-29 (1975).
1987] 697
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of an employee violates a clear public policy. The difficulty lies in
defining public policy, "the unruly horse of the law."
Public policy is sometimes based on the existence of a statute
that concerns employment-related issues. For example, it is ille-
gal to force an employee (or a prospective employee) to take a
polygraph test in Pennsylvania. 36 Thus, in Perks v. Firestone,37 a
worker who was fired for refusing to submit to a polygraph test,
successfully brought a wrongful discharge claim, because the
court had no trouble identifying a connection with a clearly ascer-
tained public policy. 38 If legislation existed forbidding drug test-
ing as a condition of employment, wrongful dismissal could
become a viable remedy for employees who are fired for refusing
to submit to urinalysis. At this writing, however, no state has en-
acted such legislation. Only California is considering legislation
on the subject, and its proposal would merely regulate, not pro-
hibit drug testing at the workplace. 39
Another interesting potential source of public policy is the
federal Constitution. What if termination of an employee (or a
failure to hire) contravenes important rights attaching to the em-
ployee under the Constitution itself? In 1983, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt with this issue in
Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co. 40 In Novosel a regional manager
was fired for refusing to lobby in favor of the No-Fault Reform
bill.41 The Third Circuit panel was unanimous: the employee's
refusal was based on his political beliefs, and therefore, his dis-
charge from the company violated public policy as expressed in
the federal and state first amendments, namely, the employee's
first amendment freedom to lobby or not as he chooses. 42 This
36. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321. Eleven other jurisdictions have en-
acted such prohibitions. Hartsfield, Polygraphs, 36 LAB. L.J. 817, 832-34 (Nov.
1985). For a list of statutes regulating the use of polygraph testing by employ-
ers, see id.
37. 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979).
38. Id. at 1364-65. Interestingly, the Parks court, in discussing the policy
behind the Pennsylvania polygraph test statute referred to in the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Community Distributors Inc. Id. at 1365-
66 (citing State v. Community Distrib., Inc., 64 N.J. 479, 317 A.2d 697 (1974)).
The policy behind eschewing such tests as conditions of employment involves a
lack of inherent accuracy, inadequate procedural safeguards in interpreting re-
sults and lack of assurance regarding the true voluntariness of consenting em-
ployee. Id.
39. Marty, supra note 2.
40. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 896.
42. Id. at 900.
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case is somewhat unique in its recognition of a constitutional ba-
sis for the public policy exception where a private employer was
the defendant. The Third Circuit made indirect use of constitu-
tional principle, channeling the first amendment through the pub-
lic policy exception to vitiate in a particular instance, the
employment-at-will doctrine. But, as Judge Becker pointed out in
his dissent from the court's denial of a re-hearing en banc, there
was no discernible government involvement-no state action-in
Novosel.43 As appealing a possibility as this may be, authority sup-
porting the public policy approach to wrongful dismissal actions
is sparse. 44
III. AVENUES OF POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL REDRESS
A. Public Employees
The fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure may provide an appropriate method of chal-
lenging urinalysis drug testing under certain circumstances. 45
However, there are considerable problems with this approach.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet considered a
case involving urine sample evidence, but it has dealt with "body
fluid" searches under the fourth amendment as applied to the
states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The extremes in analysis are perhaps best shown by Rochin v. Cal-
ifornia4 6 and Schmerber v. California.47 In Rochin, police broke into
the defendant's bedroom just in time to see him swallow capsules
which they suspected contained illegal drugs. 48 He was taken to a
hospital and had his stomach pumped.49 The United States
Supreme Court reversed his conviction, finding that the search
contravened the dictates of the due process clause of the four-
43. Id. at 903. (J., Becker, dissenting)
44. See H. PERRrrr, supra note 33, § 5.12, at 268 n.96 (survey ofjurisdictions
which have considered the possibility of public policy tort recovery based on
constitutional rights).
45. For a discussion of the fourth amendment as a constitutional basis for
challenging drug testing, see McGovern, Employee Drug-Testing Legislation:
Redrawing the Battlelines in the War on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1453, 1460-66
(1987); Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employ-
ees: Toward A General Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. Pirr. L.
REV. 201, 212-15 (1986).
46. 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (stomach pumping to obtain evidence of illegal
drugs violated due process clause of fourth amendment).
47. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood test to obtain evidence of intoxication held
reasonable search).
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teenth amendment. 50 The Court said:
Applying these general considerations to the cir-
cumstances of the present case, we are compelled to con-
clude that the proceedings by which this conviction was
obtained do more than offend some fastidious squea-
mishness or private sentimentalism about combatting
crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the
conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the pe-
titioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove
what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
contents-this course of proceeding by agents of gov-
ernment to obtain evidence is bound to offend even
hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to
the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation. 5'
Later, in Schmerber, a blood sample was taken from a defend-
ant charged with drunk driving. 52 In Schmerber, however, although
the petitioner claimed a fourth amendment violation, the search
was held to be "reasonable" under the circumstances. 53 In so
holding, the United States Supreme Court considered (1) the jus-
tification for initiating the blood test and (2) the test itself-
whether or not it was reliable, unduly risky or traumatic, and the
manner in which it was conducted. 54 Specifically, the Court noted
that Schmerber had crossed the road and driven into a tree on the
way home from a tavern.55 The blood test was administered in a
hospital, in a reasonable fashion. 56 Moreover, since alcohol me-
tabolizes so quickly there was really no time for the police to get a
warrant, and, under these facts, none was necessary. The Court
did state, however, that
the interests of human dignity and privacy which the
fourth amendment protects forbid any such intrusions
(beneath the body's surface) on the mere chance that de-
sired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a
clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found,
50. Id. at 176.
51. Id. at 172.
52. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758.
53. Id. at 759.
54. Id. at 770-7 1.
55. Id. at 758.
56. Id.
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these fundamental interests require law officers to suffer
the risk that such evidence may disappear. 57
Where does urine testing fit along the spectrum of body
search possibilities? Unlike the stomach contents of Rochin or the
blood of Schmerber, urine is a substance which is discharged regu-
larly by the human organism. Could it be said, therefore, that a
person has no "reasonable expectation of privacy in the content
of his urine?" If that were so, urine testing would not be a
"search" and would not trigger the fourth amendment. For ex-
ample, a person can have no "reasonable expectation of privacy"
in such items as his voice exemplar, 58 his handwriting, 59 or his
fingerprints. 60 How similar to these kinds of samplings is urinal-
ysis? The federal district court in McDonell v. Hunter6' concluded
there is very little similarity at all. Acknowledging that no intru-
sion into the body is necessary to seize urine, the court neverthe-
less recognized that
urine is discharged . . . under circumstances where the
person certainly has a reasonable and legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. One does not reasonably expect to dis-
charge urine under circumstances making it available to
others to collect and analyze in order to discover the
personal and physiological secrets it holds, except as
part of a medical examination. 62
57. Id. at 769-70; cf People v. Williams, 192 Colo. 249, 257-59, 557 P.2d
399, 405-07 (1976) (citing Schmerber to support proposition that blood and urine
testing of arrestees will not pass constitutional muster unless there is clear indi-
cation that desired evidence will result).
58. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).
59. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973).
60. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
61. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (D.C. Iowa 1985), aff'das modified, 809 F.2d 1302
(8th Cir. 1987).
62. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127. McDonell raises the question of whether
one can assert reasonable expectation of privacy when a public employer has
announced that urinalysis will be, or might be, conducted. In Smith v. Marliand,
the Surpeme Court held that a defendant had no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in a list of numbers dialed from his telephone (garnered by police by use of
a pen register) since he must have known that the telephone company had access
to such information. 422 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) Similarly, in United States v.
Miller, it was held that defendant's bank records were not entitled to privacy
protection since the bank's employees had access to them. 425 U.S. 435, 443
(1976). Arguing from the reasoning in Smith and Miller, a public employer could
assert that the announced existence of its testing policy removed from its work-
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The McDonell court followed this reasoning through and cate-
gorized urinalysis as a search under the fourth amendment. 63
Assuming that urine testing is a search, is it "unreasonable"
and, therefore, unconstitutional? The few courts that have con-
sidered this issue have treated it variously. 64 In Allen v. City of
Marietta,65 employees who worked with high voltage electricity
were suspected of being drug abusers, and the employer hired a
detective to observe them.66 After a two-year investigation, six
suspected employees were told either to resign or submit to
urinalysis. 67 They opted to be tested, tested positive, and were
fired.68 The searches were held to be reasonable. 69 Applying a
balancing test, the court found that the employer's legitimate
concern with the employees' behavior was so relevant to job per-
formance as to weigh more heavily than the workers' expectation
of privacy. 70
Similarly, in Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 7 1
a 1976 Seventh Circuit case, a bus driver's union challenged a
transit authority's requirement that the drivers submit to blood
and urine tests after being involved in a serious accident or when
suspected of being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 72
Again, balancing the workers' privacy interest against the transit
authority's interest in protecting public safety, the rules were ad-
63. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127.
64. The first wave of cases has been decided at the district court level, and a
few have reached the circuit courts. For an updated list of relevant decisions,
see Joseph, Fourth Amendment Implications of Public Sector Workplace Drugtesting, 11
NOVA L. REV. 605, 641, n.114 (1986-87).
65. 601 F.Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
66. Id. at 484.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 495.
70. Id. at 488-91. The court invoked an exception to the warrant require-
ment for searches of government employees. Id. at 489. It balanced the em-
ployees' privacy expectations against the asserted justifications for searching,
noting that the government was not acting in its role as law enforcer, but as
employer, with the right to conduct investigations of work-related misconduct
by its employees. Id. at 491. Consequently, employees, knowing their employer
had such investigatory rights, had lowered privacy expectations. Id. This was
the same analysis used in O'Connor v. Ortega, in which the United States Supreme
Court held that the search of a public employee's office should be judged by a
reasonableness standard, requiring neither a warrant, nor probable cause. Id. at
1497 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987)). Noting that the incep-
tion and scope of such a search must be reasonable, the Court characterized the
government's interest in an efficient workplace and the employees' lowered pri-
vacy expectations as "far less than those found at home." Id. at 1502.
71. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1029 (1976).
72. Id. at 1265-66.
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judged reasonable under the fourth amendment. 73 Specifically,
the court noted that the tests were performed in hospitals, and
only on particular employees.74
The cases discussed above involved testing of particular em-
ployees, who either behaved suspiciously or had previously been
involved in an accident. Random drug testing raises additional
issues.
In a few cases, random testing has been held to be unreason-
able. For example, in Capua v. City of Plainfield,75 a New Jersey
municipality carried out mandatory, surprise drug testing of its
entire fire fighting force. 76 Federal district Judge Sarokin found
that the municipality's actions violated the fourth amendment
since it had no "reasonable suspicion" of any of the 103 firefight-
ers before it began the testing.77 Judge Sarokin described in
some detail the rather repugnant method involved: after employ-
ees had been awakened at 7:00 a.m. one morning, they were
locked in the fire station and ordered to give urine specimens
while under observation by bonded testing agents. 78 The court
stated: "The invidious effect of such mass, round-up urinalysis is
that it casually sweeps up the innocent with the guilty and will-
ingly sacrifices each individual's Fourth Amendment rights in the
name of some larger public interest. '79
Other courts have agreed that random testing of police and
firefighters, 80 of school bus attendants,8 ' and of probationary
school teachers 82 would be unreasonable in the absence of some
form of particularized suspicion. While these cases seem to indi-
cate an emerging trend, some recent circuit court decisions stand
outside of it, and may even represent a counter-trend.
Random testing was upheld by the United States Court of
73. Id. at 1266-67.
74. Id. at 1267.
75. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
76. Id. at 1511.
77. Id. at 1516.
78. Id. at 1511.
79. Id. at 1517.
80. Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985) (up-
holding testing for police officers by construing regulation to require reasonable
suspicion of drug use); City v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. App. 1985).
81. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
82. Patchoque-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d
325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987).
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Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1986 in Shoemaker v. Handel83.
There, jockeys challenged regulations of the New Jersey State
Racing Commission which required them to undergo drug testing
at the track.84 The court described the horse racing industry as
"highly regulated," a fact which necessarily reduced the jockeys'
legitimate expectations of privacy. 85 It also identified a strong
state interest "in assuring the public of the integrity of the per-
sons engaged in the . . . industry. Public confidence forms the
foundation for the success of an industry based on wagering." 86
In addition, the tests themselves were carefully regulated to avoid
false positives, to avoid wrongful disclosure of results, and to give
the jockeys a mechanism for appealing those results. 87
A fairly elaborate set of procedural safeguards evidently
made a favorable impression on the Fifth Circuit in National Treas-
ury Employees v. Von Raab, decided on April 22, 1987.88 Reversing
the district court, Judge Rubin found that random testing of cus-
toms service employees was reasonable under the fourth amend-
ment. 89 He described in detail the manner in which this program
83. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
84. Id. at 1137.
85. Id. at 1141.
86. Id. at 1141-42. What does the court mean by "honest?" Is it referring
to the public's interest in keeping horse racing free from organized crime? Is it
suggesting that jockeys who use drugs are jockeys who deal with organized
crime or who can be bought by organized crime? Such a series of suppositions
would seem to be irrationally strung together. In order to rig a race, several, if
not most of the jockeys would have to be blackmailed-an incredible scenario.
The suggestion is reminiscent of Baseball Commissioner Ueberroth's recent jus-
tification for proposed compulsory drug testing of all major league players as
reported in the New Yorker:
Mr. Ueberroth had also raised the spectre of cocaine-afflicted players
being blackmailed by their underworld suppliers and presumably
forced to throw games at the behest of crooked gamblers, but this scare
seems to have expired from unlikelihood; fixing the 1919 World Series
required the mob to bribe seven or eight doltish, vastly underpaid
members of the Chicago White Sox, and even that trick almost
misfired.
Angell, Reflections: Three Cheers For Keith, THE NEW YORKER, May 5, 1986, at 55.
87. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1138-40. The holding in Shoemaker appears to
rest on its unique context; that of legalized gambling. See id. Similarly, in Mc-
Donell v. Hunter, the Eighth Circuit permitted random testing of prison guards
who have regular contact with the prisoners on a day-to-day basis in medium or
maximum security prisons. 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987). In that case,
the court evaluated blanket testing in a setting in which the state's interest in
safeguarding prison security, was particularly strong. Id. Indeed, other courts
have upheld random tests of prisoners. See, e.g., Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753
(8th Cir. 1986); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
88. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 173.
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was executed 90 -it was almost gentle in comparison to Capua.
Positive samples were doublechecked and could be independently
tested at a laboratory of the employee's choice, for example.9'
Only workers tentatively selected for certain sensitive jobs-those
that directly involved the interdiction of smuggling, the carrying
of a firearm, or access to classified information-would be
tested. 92 Balancing the need for the search against its invasive-
ness, Judge Rubin stated that, although "some quantum of indi-
vidualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional
search or seizure ... the [F]ourth [A]mendment imposes no irre-
ducible requirement of such suspicion." 93
Shoemaker, Von Raab, and McDonell v. Hunter, an Eighth Circuit
decision involving the random testing of prison guards, 94 point to
a developing willingness to allow random drug testing in specific
contexts in which the public's interest in a drug-free workplace is
particularly strong. In the wake of such tragic events as the Janu-
ary 4, 1987 Amtrak-Conrail collision, which killed sixteen people,
and after which two Conrail crewmen tested positive for mari-
juana, 95 there is more and more pressure to use urinalysis as a
preventative measure. On March 10, 1987, for example, a bill
that would require random testing of aviation, rail, trucking and
bus company employees was approved by the Senate Commerce
Committee. 96 It would not be surprising if the judiciary re-
sponded along similar lines, by increasing the number of contexts
in which mass testing would be permitted, in the interest of public
safety. 97
B. State Constitutions As a Source of Protection for Employees
The federal constitutional attack on drug testing is severely
limited by the state action requirement. When private employers
90. Id. at 174.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 173-74.
93. Id. at 176 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61
(1976).
94. McDonell, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
95. See Amtrak Official Says He Was Was Wrong to Let Crew In Crash Delay Drug
Tests, The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 3, 1987, at 2, col. 1.
96. Panel Votes Transport-Industry Drug Tests, The Philadelphia Inquirer,
March 11, 1987, at 3, col. 2.
97. See, e.g., Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power, No. CV 86-L308 (D. Neb.
Feb. 23, 1986)(random drug testing permitted of nuclear plant employees); Na-
tional Assoc. of Air Traffic Specialists v. Dole, 2 IER Cases 68 (D. Alaska 1987)
(random drug testing of air traffic controllers permitted).
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institute such programs, they do not violate the Constitution,
since it only restricts governmental activity.
A fascinating, though underused, end-run around this limita-
tion does exist. While the federal judiciary interprets the federal
constitution to set minimum standards for American citizens' civil
rights, state courts are free to interpret state constitutions more
expansively, giving state citizens more rights. In some contexts,
this freedom has led state courts to do away with the state action
requirement, and to make private entities cleave to constitutional
standards. 9 8
The so-called "fundamental right to privacy" under the fed-
eral Constitution, encompassing the right of married couples to
have access to birth control9 9 and a woman's right to abortion,' 0 0
has been perceived by the Supreme Court only in a "penumbra"
surrounding the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth
amendments. 1 1 Ten state constitutions have expressly protected
the privacy right. For example, the privacy provisions of the con-
stitutions of Alaska, Montana and California are not expressly
limited to protection from government interference. 0 2 However,
Alaska's provision has been interpreted to restrict only govern-
mental intrusion,' 0 3 and Montana's privacy provision, at one time
applicable to private defendants, 0 4 has recently been restricted
98. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977). For cases preventing private abridgement of
first amendment rights using the state constitutional route, see, e.g., Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1979) (California Constitution protects speech and petitioning, reasonably ex-
ercised, in shopping centers even when centers are privately owned.), aff'd, 447
U.S. 74 (1980); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 542-45 , 423 A.2d 615, 626-28
(1980) (protecting distribution of pamphlets on campus of Princeton University,
private university, under New Jersey state constitution) Cf. Grafton v. Brooklyn
Law School. 478 F.2d 1137, 1143 (2d Cir. 1973) (first amendment not readily
met in case of private educational institution); Cologne v. Westfarms Assoc., 37
Conn. Supp. 90, 110-17,442 A.2d 471, 477-82 (1982) (Connecticut constitution
protects shopping center solicitations from private interference); Alderwood v.
Washington Envt. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 239-43, 635 P.2d 108, 114-16
(1981) (using state constitution to protect persons signing initiatives from inter-
ference by private owner of shopping center).
99. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
100. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
101. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
102. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIz. CONST. art. 2 § 8; CAL. CONST. art.
I § 1; FLA. CONST. art I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 5, 12;
LA. CONST. art 1, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. 4, § 10; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7.
103. Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 416 (Alaska 1976).
104. See, e.g., State v. Hyem, 630 P.2d 202 (Mont. 1981) (two private indi-
viduals and one real estate agent); State v. Van Haele, 199 Mont. 522, 649 P.2d
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by a state action requirement. 10 5
California is another story. In White v. Davis,'0 6 Judge
Trobriner used the state privacy provision to label police surveil-
lance of UCLA classrooms unconstitutional. 0 7 Although in that
case there certainly was government involvement, Judge Tobriner
quoted from the election brochure drafted by proponents of Cali-
fornia's article 1, section 1 (a form of legislative history), which
focused on the individual's interest in "[p]revent[ing] govern-
ment and business interests from collecting and stockpiling unneces-
sary information about us and from misusing information
gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to
embarrass us."' 08 In another case, the same statutory provision
was actually directed at private wrongdoing, where a group of
doctors had allegedly waged a campaign of harrassment against
an abortion clinic.' 0 9
This is one of several tacks that Barbara Luck, the plaintiff in
the case against Southern Pacific, successfully took. She argued
that random testing of employees in non-safety-related jobs
amounts to the "collecting and stockpiling of unnecessary infor-
mation" that the Calfornia constitution aims to prevent.110
IV. "CONSTITUTIONALIZING" THE CORPORATION AS AN
UNTAPPED SOURCE OF EMPLOYEE PROTECTION
An argument can be made that the public/private distinction
is increasingly inappropriate, given the tremendous power that is
wielded by large corporations in American society.''' That these
giants have enormous political and social influence is a fact that
1311 (1982) (storage company managers); State v. Helfrich, 183 Mont. 484, 600
P.2d 816 (1979)(neighbor); State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. 204, 485 P.2d 47 (1971)
(sister).
105. State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153, 156 (Mont. 1985) (reversing previously
articulated rule applying state constitutional privacy provision to private individ-
uals and now requiring state action).
106. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
107. Id. at 773-77, 533 P.2d at 232-35, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 104-06.
108. Id. at 774, 533 P.2d at 233-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105. (emphasis
added).
109. Chico Feminist Women's Health Center v. Butte Glenn Medical Soc'y,
557 F. Supp. 1190, 1202 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
110. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Demurrer, at 15. Luck v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., C 84-3-230 (1986).
111. For an excellent series of articles on the public/private distinction in
American jurisprudence, see Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1289-1608 (1982) including Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor
Law, Id. at 1361-75; Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private
Distinctions Matter? Id. at 1445-48.
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has been noted and analyzed for decades."l 2 Some commenta-
tors have' i3 viewed large corporations as quasi-governments, but
governments with a difference: corporations are basically unac-
countable to their constituents, i.e., their shareholders. As one
scholar put it: "The official doctrine that the corporate directors
are responsible to the stockholders is so irrelevant as to be ridicu-
lous. The directors are, if reality is considered, effectively respon-
sible to management and management tends to be self-
perpetuating."1 4 Whereas the power of government is constitu-
tionally limited by a system of checks and balances, by the doc-
trine of federalism, by the Bill of Rights, and by the electoral
process, the power of private industry is, in the opinion of many,
unchecked and unresponsive to either its shareholders or to the
general public. 15
As long ago as 1876, the United States Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that there might be reason to curb corporate behav-
ior where it was "affected with a public interest," as when it
upheld rate regulation of grain storage warehouses that were a
virtual monopoly.I16 However, this particular route to control of
private enterprise was not developed much further by the
Court. 1 7 Instead, it moved full-tilt into the period known as the
Lochner-era, during which legislative attempts to limit the power
of private industry were often struck down as violations of sub-
stantive due process."18
In fact, as the courts backed off, the ownership of productive
power in America grew increasingly concentrated. From 1880 to
1920, because of such devices as vertical and horizontal corporate
expansion, merger, and the use of trusts and holding companies,
112. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1932); R. BRADY, BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER (1943); R.
HARRISON, PLURALISM AND CORPORATISM: THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACIES (1980); G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DE-
MOCRACY (1966); A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE (1976); R. NADER
& M. GREEN, CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA (1973).
113. G. MCCONNELL, supra note 112, at 250 (quoting A. BERLE, THE TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 51 (1954)).
114. Epstein, Societal, Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility-Product and Process, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287 (1979).
115. Id. at 1318-20.
116. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
117. See, e.g., The Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886) (reaffirm-
ing Munn, upholding state regulation of railroad tariffs).
118. The archetypical case was Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
During the period between 1897 and 1937 the Court was often willing to invali-
date economic regulation of private industry by means of the due process clause.
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there was a rapid consolidation of corporate power. 1 9 By 1937,
394 corporations, or less than one-tenth of 1% of all corporations
reporting for federal tax purposes, owned about 45% of all cor-
porate assets. 120 At the same time, the proportion of Americans
dependent on wages from these companies grew. Between 1860
and 1920, for instance, non-agricultural employment rose from
41% to 73% of all gainful employment. 12 1 And a higher and
higher percentage of people worked for the few largest compa-
nies. By 1980, over 4.6 million workers, or nearly 28.7% of all
"Fortune 500" employees had jobs with the top twenty "Fortune
500" manufacturers.' 22 In 1980, the largest 200 industrial firms
accounted for more than 60% of all U.S. industrial assets; the
share of the largest 0.2% of those was 73%.123
The authors of the Bill of Rights could not have foreseen the
gigantism of corporations today. They lived in a society freshly
victimized by overintrusive government, and the document they
produced is therefore infused with laissez-faire philosphy. 124 Re-
strictions on government vis-a-vis the press, criminal suspects, or
individual expression of political and religious beliefs are just a
few of the ways in which the Constitution clearly aims at minimiz-
ing the effect of concentrated power on individual Americans. If
the Founding Fathers could witness Barbara Luck's termination
by Southern Pacific, they might wish the event to have constitu-
tional repercussions. Arguably, they might consider that the case
hinged upon whether or not Southern Pacific exercised overbear-
ing power, and not whether that power was characterized as pub-
lic or private.
There are those who believe that the only meaningful re-
sponse to the power of private industry in our society is to "con-
stitutionalize" large corporations-in other words, to make "state
119. See A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 285-376 (1977).
120. TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMISSION ON THE CONCENTRATION
OF ECONOMIC POWER IN THE UNITED STATES, 77TH CONG., IST SESS., FINAL RE-
PORT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 169 (Comm. Print 1941).
121. E. KIRKLAND, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIFE 484 (3d ed.
1951).
122. Hayes, Twenty Five Years of Change in the Fortune 500, FORTUNE, May 5,
1980, at 88, 94 (chart).
123. W. MUELLER, THE CELLAR-KEFAUVER ACT: THE FIRST 27 YEARS, H.R.
Doc. No. 243, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1979).
124. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ.
1013, 1051-72 (1984); see also Fallon, A Constructive Coherence Theory of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1227 n.189 (1987) (summarizing
Ackerman's view that framers were partial to laissez-faire notions).
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action" obsolete and to hold industry accountable to the princi-
ples embodied in the Bill of Rights.' 25 While this approach may
seem attractively simple, it is clearly not likely to be adopted
soon, if ever, by the elected representatives of the American
people.
V. POLICY CONCERNS
A. Reliability of Testing Methods
Both employers and employees share the same concern:
whether or not urinalysis is a reliable means of uncovering drug
use. Employees, of course, worry over the accuracy of drug test-
ing, since they may be hired or fired on the basis of the test re-
sults. Employers are also interested in test-reliability since they
do not want their time and money wasted on ferreting out and
punishing innocent workers only to spend more time and money
on replacing them.
There are many serious problems with the reliability of such
tests. Certain over-the-counter drugs may register false positives.
Urine samples taken from people using the familiar cold remedies
Contac or Sudafed have indicated the use of amphetamines. The
pain relievers Datril and Advil have shown up as marijuana, and
cough syrups containing dextromethorphan may register opiate
traces. Some prescription drugs can also produce such false posi-
tives.126 A person with the disease lupus (in remission) might test
positive for amphetamines; a person who had ingested pop-
pyseeds just before urinalysis could appear to have opium in his
system. Worse still, research indicates that "passive inhalation"
can register positive test results. In other words, a person could
test as a marijuana user, not because he actually smoked the drug,
but because he had been present at a concert, a party, or on a bus
where marijuana was smoked. 127
125. See A. BERLE, TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1954) and
his THREE FACES OF POWER, (1967); see also Miller, The Corporation as a Private
Government in the World Community, 46 VA. L. REV. 1539 (1960).
126. Marty, supra note 2, at 50 (quoting Kerry Shannon, marketing director
of Bio-Analytical Technologies); Stille, supra note 2, at 23, col. 1.
127. Alcohol and Drug Testing, A Workshop on Invasion of Privacy, spon-
sored by Philaposh and the Workers' Rights Law Project, Philadelphia, May 22,
1986 (statement of Karen Detamore, attorney). While serving as a panelist at
the Philadelphia Workshop, Ms. Detamore described an instance in which a per-
son in the Coast Guard whose job it was to confiscate smuggled drugs had evi-
dently tested positive due to touching them frequently, and was subsequently
discharged. Id.; see also Hansen, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing, 253
J.A.M.A. 2382 (1985); Zeidenberg, Bourdon & Nahas, Marituana Intoxication by
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How often are these mistakes made? The testing laborato-
ries assert that the most commonly used procedures are 95-99%
accurate. At best, then, the industry itself admits to an inaccu-
racy rate of 1%. But since four to five million people are tested
each year this means that 40,000 to 50,000 people must be falsely
accused each year.' 28 And a study by Northwestern University
found that 25% of all EMIT (Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay
Test) positives were actually false positives.' 29 This darkens the
picture considerably: The EMIT is one of the more popular vari-
eties of drug tests, since it is relatively inexpensive. EMIT and
similar procedures cost about $5 for initial test results. A confir-
mation or double-check test costs about $80.
Even more sinister is the possibility that drug testing may be
racially discriminatory. 30 The skin pigment melanin, which is
present in urine in fragmentary form, is chemically similar to
THC (tetrahydrocannabinol), the active ingredient in marijuana.
According to James Woodford, a forensic chemist and consultant
to the U.S. Public Health Service, melanin also "acts as a
sponge," by soaking up chemicals in the body similar to THC.
Everyone has some melanin, but blacks and Hispanics have more
than whites. Woodford suggests that, especially in laboratories
which use very low readings of what appears to be marijuana-ten
billionths of a gram-to conclude that a person uses the drug,
results are skewed against dark-skinned people.' 3 '
Passive Inhalation: Documentation by Detection of Urinary ietabolites, 134 AM. J. Psy-
CHIATRY 76 (1977); Passive Inhalation of Marijuana Smoke, 250J.A.M.A. 898 (1983)
(letter to the editor).
128. Stille, supra note 2, at 24, col. 1. (quoting Kevin V. Zeese of the Na-
tional Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws).
129. Marty, supra note 2, at 50. Perhaps most telling are the results of a
1987 study performed by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, which found
that 20% of 50 laboratories tested reported the presence of drugs in urine speci-
mens when no drugs were in fact, present. These mistakes were made even
though each laboratory had been warned in advance that its incompetence was about to
be evaluated by the federal government. Labs Err on Drug Test, StudV Finds, The
Philadelphia Inquirer, April 8, 1987, at A3, col. 1. The urinalysis industry is
booming-it is a $100 million a year business, soon to be $200 million annually
and so it is becoming increasingly competitive. Id. Laboratories are under in-
creasing pressure to cut corners in order to cut prices. Marty, supra note 2, at
24-25. At present, there is no federal or state regulation of nonmedical drug-
use testing facilities, their personnel, or their performance. Dubowski, Drug-Use
Testing: Scientific Perspectives, 11 NOVA L. REV. 415, 532 (1986-87).
130. Marty, supra note 2, at 23; see also Rothstein, Screening Workers for Drugs:
A Legal and Ethical Framework, 11 EMP. REL. L.J. 422, 426 (1985-86). Evidently,
there is a more accurate urine testing method available, but it costs approxi-
mately $500, making it very unlikely that employers will choose to use it. Angell,
supra note 65, at 56.
131. The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 9, 1986. If urinalysis does have a
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B. Employer Interests in Conducting Drug Testing Programs
Even assuming that urine testing is reliable, or could be
hedged with enough procedural safeguards (the right to appeal,
to have an independent test, etc.) to compensate for its unreliabil-
ity how well does it serve the employer's concerns?
One of these concerns is that drug-using employees have an
unusually great need for money, and will be more prone to steal
than other employees. The problem of employee theft is far from
imaginary: it costs employers between forty and fifty billion dol-
lars a year.' 3 2 But if worker theft is the disease, is urine testing
for drugs the best cure? There is a virtually unlimited number of
circumstances that might cause a person to need extra money.
Suppose an employee has a disabled dependent, or a few too
many credit card debts.' 33 Urinalysis is obviously no solution for
these theft problems.
"disparate impact" on certain racial or ethnic groups, it may violate Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bars discrimination by any employer of more
than 25 workers. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1971).
For example, in the sports context, many black athletes have expressed fears
that submission to drug testing will be made compulsory in certain contracts
with direct discriminatory intent. Angell, supra, note 86 at 56 . But see Shield
Club v. City of Cleveland, 647 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (concluding that
melanin theory is not supported by evidence and is too speculative).
132. Stack, Polygraphs and Privacy, 59 FLA. B.J. 19 (June 1985). According to
this article, 40% of all employees steal office supplies, while 75% of those han-
dling money steal some of it. Id.
133. Or should an employer have the right to gather such information as a
condition of employment? Surely the most efficient way to weed out dishonest
employees is to test them for the trait they all must share: dishonesty. That is
the reason for the use of polygraph testing in the workplace. Yet the use of
polygraphs in the workplace, while perhaps the most direct solution to the prob-
lem, has created problems of its own, including legal ones, for many of the same
reasons plaguing the analogous use of urinalysis. Concerns over employee pri-
vacy and test unreliability have led to litigation under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, the common law, civil rights laws and the constitution. See, e.g.,
Ramirez v. City, 678 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1982) (Title VII action); Tameny v. At-
lantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1980)
(wrongful discharge action recognized); Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363
N.W.2d 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (suit for emotional distress). Polygraph test-
ing is regulated or banned by legislation in 41 states, and in March of last year,
the House of Representatives passed a Polygraph Protection Act which would
forbid private employers from polygraphing most current or prospective em-
ployees. Conservative Republican Orrin Hatch and liberal Democrat Ted Ken-
nedy introduced similar legislation in the Senate in April of 1986 which means
that it is probable that federal law restricting the use of lie-detector tests in pri-
vate employment will exist in the very near future. See Gardner, Wiretapping the
Mind A Call to Regulate Truth Verification in Employment, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295
(1984); Hartsfield, Polygraphs, 36 LAB. L.J. 817 (1985); Hermann, Privacy, the Pro-
spective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personal-
ity Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73 (1971).
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Employers claim that they need to know about an employee's
drug use for safety's sake: the public safety, the safety of other
employees, even the safety of the drug-abusing worker. They are
understandably concerned about the concommitant costs of acci-
dents on the job which become their costs, one way or the other.
Substance abusers file five times as many worker's compensation
claims as non-using employees, for instance. 34 They are more
likely to be involved in accidents and their employers are more
likely to be held vicariously liable for the resulting damages.' 3 5 In
one case, a machine operator was discovered to be drunk at work
and told to go home early. 136 On the way home, he was involved
in a car accident in which he and several other people were
killed.137 The company was found negligent-not vicariously lia-
ble, but directly negligent-for sending a highly intoxicated indi-
vidual out on the road.' 38
Management is legitimately concerned about the costs of
drug-related behavior, but does urinalysis adequately address
those concerns? Research shows that there are more alcohol-re-
lated accidents than accidents caused by all illegal substances
combined. 3 9 In light of the fact that urinalysis can turn up evi-
dence that the test subject smoked one marijuana cigarette as
many as eighty-one days earlier, but cannot produce evidence of
alcohol ingested just one-half day earlier,140 the test appears to be
less finely-tuned to the desired end than employers need it to be.
Even so, urinalysis will uncover "users," and statistics do indicate
that such individuals are more accident prone than their fellow
workers. Perhaps it is just as simple as that.
Or is it? Even assuming a strong link between job safety and
drug abuse, is it truly in an employer's best interest to initiate a
urinalysis test program? There are those who believe that it is
not. 14 1 To operate a business productively, employers need
134. Geidt, Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Workplace: Balancing Employer and
Employee Rights, 11 EMP. REL. L.J. 181, 191 (1985).
135. In addition, such workers have greater health care needs, higher rates
of absenteeism, and are more likely to require discipline. Lehr, supra note 14, at
85-86.
136. Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1983).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 315.
139. Rothstein, supra note 129, at 423 n.2.
140. Cocaine is flushed out of the body within two-to-three days. Stille,
supra note 2, at 24 col. 1 (quoting Professor Dubrowski, forensic toxicologist at
the University of Oklahoma).
141. A National Institue of Justice study on employee theft shows that em-
ployers who display respect for their employees' rights and do not administer lie
1987] 713
23
Halbert: Coming Up Dirty: Drug Testing at the Work Place
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
healthy employee morale; a workforce which wants to cooperate
with management, not only for monetary reasons, but also out of
some sense of shared goals. This intangible, but essential ingre-
dient, "team spirit," will be severely undercut if workers are ex-
pected to urinate into bottles on demand.
C. Countervailing Employee Interests
Employees object to compulsory urinalysis mainly because
they consider it an invasion of privacy. Their complaint has two
aspects: (1) the process itself is humiliating to endure and (2) test
results tell more about an individual's life than employers need to
know. 142
Being ordered to produce a urine specimen is not equivalent
to, for example, being ordered to empty one's pockets, or being
ordered to submit to fingerprinting. It has an especially embar-
rassing and dehumanizing edge to it. It forces a person to dis-
close some facet of his or her private life in a way that involves the
"private parts." Roger Angell wrote in the New Yorker recently:
"Racehorses have their urine tested, to be sure, but, as one All-
Star American League infielder put it to me last fall, 'I am not a
horse."'143
That must have been Rodney Smith's first reaction when he
refused to supply a urine sample to a congressional subcommittee
recently. This was a rather ironic situation: Mr. Smith, executive
director of the President's Commission on Organized Crime, was
a supporter of proposed legislation that would make drug testing
without any warning, mandatory for federal employees. When
detector tests have a lower theft rate than those who do administer such tests.
738 LAB. LAW REP., April 11, 1986, at 16. During the floor debate of the Poly-
graph Protection Act, Rep. Jeffords stated:
I have ... been . . . telling business and unions alike that we cannot
afford to waste our time, energy and resources on disputes, and that we
must work more as a team . . . Do polygraphs have any place in this
drive for labor-management cooperation? The question answers it-
self. Of course they do not. A workplace run on fear will run fearfully.
270 LAB. LAw REP., April 14, 1986, at 31. How much less does urine testing
have any place in today's workplace!
142. Stille, supra note 2, at 22, col. 1, reporting the following:
"A simple thing like urine can tell you a lot," says Dr. Harold M. Bates,
a chemist with Metpath Laboratories of Teterboro, N.J., which per-
forms drug test analyses. It can tell a company whether an employee is
being treated for a heart condition, manic-depression, epilepsy, diabe-
tes, or schizophrenia.
Id.; see also McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (D. Iowa 1985), modi-
fied, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
143. Angell, supra note 65, at 56.
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the subcommittee chairperson was about to begin questioning, he
told Smith: "The chair will require you to go to the men's room
under the direct observation of a male member of the subcommit-
tee staff to urinate in this specimen bottle."' 144 A plastic container
was then placed on the witness table 45 and when Smith angrily
refused to cooperate, complaining that he had had no notice, the
chairman graciously stated "I thank you for very eloquently prov-
ing the point that we have set out to prove." 146
Naturally, employees are also concerned about the way drug
testing inevitably divulges so much extraneous information about
a person's life to an employer. For example, a test can reveal,
among other things, whether or not a worker is pregnant, is tak-
ing medication for a heart condition, for asthma, for diabetes, or
for manic depression. It is a powerful tool for prying into a
worker's off-duty behavior, and while the use of drugs on the job
is admittedly a very serious problem, employees argue that the
decisions they make regarding drugs during non-working hours
are not their bosses' business.
Privacy is not just a matter of minimizing the amount of in-
formation known about a person, but also involves control over
that information. And so employees worry that the confidentiality
of test results is not guaranteed. Will they become part of a per-
manent, computerized file, accessible to any number of important
and powerful strangers? Could a worker be blacklisted because
of a false positive, and never know why his or her career was stag-
nating? These are hardly far-fetched or paranoid possibilities.
The combination of forced drug testing and late twentieth cen-
tury technology makes these concerns very real. As Professor
Bloustein wrote: "The fear that a private life may be turned into
a public spectacle is greatly enhanced when the lurid facts have
been reduced to key punches or blips on a magnetic tape accessi-
ble, perhaps, to any clerk who can throw the appropriate
switch." 147
D. The Public Interest
The debate over drug testing is not just between workers and
employers. Very important societal interests are also at stake.
144. The Philadelphia Inquirer, March 19, 1986.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Pros-
ser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 1006 (1964).
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For instance, there is no doubt that drug abuse at the workplace
represents a tremendous drain of human and financial re-
sources.'148 There is, on the other hand, a need to maintain rea-
sonably good relations between labor and management. To the
extent that the American workforce is antagonistic and alienated
there is also a serious drain on resources, and mandatory urinal-
ysis will only worsen the problem.
American society in general has an overwhelming interest in
maintaining itself as a system in which individuals enjoy a consid-
erable degree of freedom to pursue personal goals. Compulsory
urine testing undercuts this interest, by radically diminishing the
privacy expectations of millions of American workers, and by con-
tributing to a general atmosphere of diminished privacy through-
out the country.
What is so essential about a sense of privacy? Alan Westin, in
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, categorizes the functions of individual pri-
vacy: personal autonomy (the need to avoid being controlled
wholly by others), emotional release (the need to express one's
relaxed self, the "chance to lay (one's) mask aside"), self-evalua-
tion (the opportunity to process, by oneself, the flood of informa-
tion one experiences, to "repossess" oneself) and limited and
protected communication (control over forced self-disclosure).149
While recognizing that individual privacy cannot be guaranteed
as an absolute right, he writes: "Just as a social balance favoring
disclosure and surveillance over privacy is a functional necessity
for totalitarian systems, so a balance that ensures strong citadels
of individual .. .privacy and limits both disclosure and surveil-
lance is a prerequisite for liberal democratic societies."' 50 There
are scholars who insist, moreover, that privacy must be protected
as a necessary precondition to much that is considered basic
human activity. As Professor Fried puts it:
[Privacy] is necessarily related to ends and relations of
the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and
trust. Privacy is not merely a good technique for further-
ing these fundamental relations, rather, without privacy
they are simply inconceivable . . .privacy is the neces-
sary atmosphere for these attitudes and actions, as oxy-
148. For a discussion of the financial burdens associated with drug testing,
see supra notes 8 & 126-40 and accompanying text.
149. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, 32-39 (1967).
150. Id. at 24.
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gen is for combustion.' 5'
The right to privacy, then, cannot be viewed simply as a mat-
ter of assuring certain specific preferences, such as the right of
married couples to use birth control, or the right of a woman to
choose abortion. It is more than just a "penumbra" hovering
somewhere in the vicinity of the Bill of Rights. It is not to be
contained in the neat tort pigeonholes of intrusion, disclosure,
false light and appropriation. The law, lumbering rather clumsily
behind technological change and our best hopes for a free soci-
ety, must catch up to our rightful and essential need for privacy.
VI. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
This writer's first choice would be to outlaw urinalysis drug
testing in the workplace. If employers must examine their work-
ers to determine whether or not they are drug abusers, let them
take saliva samples, but only from employees for whom they have
evidence of impaired job performance. Marijuana is held in the
saliva from six to eight hours after it has been smoked. The saliva
test, administered in this fashion, would be well-tailored to de-
tecting intoxicated workers, and would be far less corrosive of
personal dignity than urinalysis. It is at present recommended by
the Maryland ACLU in the form of a model bill. 152
If urinalysis drug testing must exist, let it be regulated. Both
the circumstances that trigger the testing, and the testing proce-
dure itself, must be controlled. Employees should be tested only
after employers have documented job-site performance
problems. Random testing, or testing on the basis of a rumor, or
a mere hunch, should be forbidden. This would insure that
urinalysis would be kept closely tied to its supposed purpose-
discovering substance abusers at the workplace-and would avoid
a dragnet operation, or an atmosphere in which every worker is
treated as if he were guilty until proven innocent. Such safe-
guards would also make it more difficult for employers to use
urinalysis discriminatorily, picking out test subjects because of
their politics, their interests in union organizing, or their skin
color, for instance.153
151. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE LJ. 475, 477-78 (1968); see also Bloustein, supra
note 146, at 1000-07; Gerstein, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The De-
velopment and Protection of Private Life, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385, 414 (1984).
152. Stille, supra note 2, at 24, col. 1.
153. At the Philadelphia Workshop on Invasion of Privacy in May 1986,
Mark Cohen, Chairperson of the Pennsylvania House Labor Relations Commit-
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It would also eliminate pre-employment urinalysis screening.
Of course, employers would still be able to screen workers by
such traditional methods as careful interviews and reference
checks. They would still have access to information about a pro-
spective employee's work history. What would be denied them
would be a "scientific" device for measuring character, when it
may well be that the best measure of human character is human
character. Employers could continue to use their own instincts,
and those of their trusted subordinates, in deciding who to hire.
Drug testing laboratories should be licensed (no civilian labs
are so licensed as of this writing), 154 and tests performed only by
those that are certified. Employees should have the right to an
independent confirmation of positive test results, or perhaps the
right to a re-test. Provisions like these would minimize the conse-
quences of false positives.
There must be confidentiality safeguards. Negative test re-
sults should be immediately destroyed, since the mere fact of hav-
ing been tested will carry its share of stigma.
VII. CONCLUSION
No one denies that America has a sickness-drug use-and
no one denies that the American workplace, like the American
home or American city streets, is the scene of much drug abuse.
But let the cure be laws that take aim at the cause, as well as the
symptoms, of the disease. Rehabilitation and therapy programs
begin to point in the direction of preventative treatment. Em-
ployers that use urinalysis should be directed to institute and/or
make use of such programs, giving their employees who test posi-
tive a chance to get the monkey off their backs.
tee, expressed concern that union organizers or members might be victimized by
retaliatory drug testing. Workshop, supra note 5 (statement of Mark Cohen). In
addition, black athletes have articulated similar concerns. For a discussion of
these concerns, see supra note 131.
In April of 1986 the Georgia ACLU filed a complaint on behalf of four
workers at Georgia Power Company who had frequently reported safety viola-
tions at the plant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In their complaint,
the workers claimed that a "hotline" system for reporting worker drug abuse
had been used by their employer to retaliate against them. Hudner, Urine Testing
for Drugs, I NOVA L. REV. 553, 557-58, (1986-87).
154. See Workshop, supra note 5 (statement of Karen Detamore).
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